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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Action on Fraudulent Promise Not Barred by Statute of Frauds
In Channel Master Corp. v. Aluminium Limited Sales, Inc.,7" a deceit
action 5y a processor against a supplier of aluminum, the alleged misrepresentations were (1) a representation that defendant's capacity and commitments were
such as to enable it to sell to plaintiff a dependable supply during the next fEve
years, whereas in truth defendant's capacity for years to come was already committed to other customers, and (2) ,± representation that it was defendant's
intention to supply plaintiff a certain amount of ingot per month for five years,
whereas defendant's actual intent was to sell to plaintiff only such amount as
those customers to whom defendant was committed should choose to forego. The
77
complaint also alleged the requisite scienter, deception, and injury. It is well
settled that a misrepresentation of present intent can constitute fraud. 78 Defendant, however, attacked the sufficiency of the complaint on two grounds: (1) that
the alleged representations were mere expressions of expectancy and thus did
not constitute statements of presently existing facts; and (2) that no cause of
action could be based upon an oral promise unenforcible under the Statute of
Frauds. 79
The Court of Appeals sustained the sufficiency of the complaint as against
both of defendant's contentions but split 4-3 over the first of these. The majority
held the representations to constitute "a specific affirmation of an arrangement
under which something is to occur, when the" party knows perfectly well that
no such things is to occur"80 and thus to fall within the scope of previous
holdings. The dissent, on the other hand, while not disagreeing with the principles laid down by the majority, gave the alleged representations a stricter interpretation and found them to be mere statements of expectancy, relating to
matters not within defendant's control, and thus not to justify plaintiff's reliance.
In view of the widespread use of the concept of present capacity for future production, the definiteness of the alleged representations, and the principle that
unfounded pretence of knowledge may constitute fraud,81 the majority holding
seems well within precedent.
The Court's holding that the Statute of Frauds does not bar a. fraud action
based upon an unenforcible promise made with intent not to perform was not
questioned by the dissent but seems to be a reversal of at least the direction
76. 4 N.Y.2d 403, 176 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1958).
77. For the requisite elements of an action in fraud see Brackett v. Griswold,
112 N.Y. 454, 20 N.E. 376 (1889).
78. AL S. Rampell, Inc. v. Hyster Co., 3 N.Y.2d 369, 383, 165 N.Y.S.2d 475,
487 (1957).
79. N. Y. PERSONAL PRoPmrrY LAW §31(1).
80. Ritzwoller v. Lurie, 225 N.Y. 464, 468, 122 N.E. 634. 635 (1919).
81. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931); Hadcock
v. Osmer, 153 N.Y. 604, 47 N.E. 923 (1897).
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of previous New York cases. The possibility of distinguishing the present situation from the authority of Dung v.Parkers2 and Subirana v. Munds,83 two cases
often cited to the effect that a fraud action may not be maintained where the
promise is unenforcible under the Statute, seems foreclosed by a recent Court of
Appeals case 84 which affirmed without opinion a Special Term holding that
under those cases (Dung v.Parker and Subirana v.Munds) the Statute of Frauds
barred an action in fraud based upon a fraudulent promise to sell real estate,
notwithstanding allegations of all the requisites of a fraud action.
The Court in the present case depended mainly upon a conceptional distinction between contract and tort theory. It quoted from two cases 5 dealing with
the problems of whether certain promises, made with intent not to perform,
constituted misrepresentations of existing facts and whether defendant owed
any duty to plaintiff. It also quoted from Harper and James, in The Law of
Torts, stating that the fraud cause of action is entirely "independent of contractual relations between the parties."8 6 But this language of Harper and James
dealt with the development of the independence of the deceit action from
warranty theory. And Harper and James are directly opposed to allowing such an
action in fraud where the Statute of Frauds bars a contract action.8 7 The other
authorities relied upon by the Court are the Restatement,8 8 and Prosser,8 9 both
of which directly support the holding.
The result reached by the Court seems desirable and unopposed to the
policy of the Statute of Frauds. The merely conceptual difference between contract
and tort theory would not justify a disregard of the Statute, but the differende
in the substantive requirements for relief might. The policy of the Statute includes
protection against false claims, protection against claims based upon ambiguous
and frivolous promises, and insurance of seriousness on the part of the promisor.
How do the stricter requirements of the fraud action meet this policy? The interest in insuring seriousness is clearly met. The intent required for recovery in
fraud is not only a consciousness on the part of the defendant of the falsity of
his representations, but also consciousness that plaintiff will rely thereon. 90 There82. 52 N.Y. 494 (1873). See Rice v. Manley, 66 N.Y. 82 (1876), and Burgdofer v. Thielmann, 153 Or. 354, 55 P.2d 1122 (1936), which attempt to limit the
broad language of Dung v. Parker.
83. 282 N.Y. 726, 26 N.E.2d 828 (1940). See Automatic Truck Loader Corp.
v. City of New York, 57 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Sup.Ct. 1945), which attempts to limit and
distinguish Dung v. Parker,supra note 82, and Subirana v. Munds from a situation like the present.
84. Redlark Realty Corp. v. Mlinkin, 306 N.Y. 762, 118 N.E.2d 362 (1954).
85. Sabo v. Delman, 3 N.Y.2d 155, 164 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1957); Deyo v. Hudson,
225 N.Y. 602, 122 N.E. 635 (1919).
86.

1 HARPER

AND JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS

527.

87. Id. at 573.
88. 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §525, §530, comment b (1934).
89. PROSSER, TORTS 565 (2d ed. 1955).
90. Brackett v. Griswold, supra note 77; Hadcock v. Osmer, supra note 81.
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fore the defendant cannot be held liable if his promise was not meant to be taken
seriously.
T-e interest in protecting against false claims is not so clearly satisfied. The
cliche that the Statute of Frauds should not be allowed to shield the perpetration
of a fraud is of little use because the Statute was enacted not for the purrose
of barring justified claims but out of a fear that justified claims could not be
distinguished from unjustified claims. 'he question is whether they can be more
easily distinguished in fraud than in contract actions. Two peculiarities of the
fraud action would seem to present a satisfactory answer to this question. In
the first place the plaintiff must prove that the intent of defendant, at the time
of the promise, was not to perform. 91 This intent cannot be inferred from a
mere breach of the promise. 92 Thus, proof of actual conduct manifesting such an
intent would be required, and this manifestation, in order to justify reliance,
would have had to occur upon a different occasion from the making of the
promise. Such manifestation would usually amount to something other than
mere statements to plaintiff subsequent to plaintiff's reliance; such a defendant
would not be likely to tell plaintiff that he had never intended to perform his
promise. Thus, independent proof of the requisite intent would tend to establish
the existence of the promise. The second distinguishing feature of a fraud action for
these purposes is the measure of damages. New York follows the "out of pocket"
rather than the "benefit of the bargain" rule in awarding damages in fraud
actions. The principle of indemnity is controlling. 3 The incentive to fabricate
false claims is greatly reduced because plaintiff can gain nothing; he can only
be restored to his position at the time of the alleged promise. Since the Statute
of Frauds is deemed a harsh and arbitrary measure and the courts have tended to
restrict its application, these substantive differences from the contract action
seem adequately to justify the Court's refusal to apply the Statute to a fraud
action like the present.
Unfair Business Competition
Plaintiff corporation was engaged in a business in which by contract with
individual householders, it sent out crews of men to perform ordinary housecleaning chores in an assembly-line manner. Defendants were several of its employees who had quit and formed a competing business for which they solicited
customers of plaintiff. Plaintiff in this action asked that they be restrained from
engaging in the same business as plaintiff, from soliciting its customers, and for
91. Adams v. Clark, 239 N.Y. 403, 146 N.E. 642 (1925).
92. Ibid.
93. Sager v. Friedman, 270 N.Y. 472, 1 N.E. 2d 971 (1936); Foster v. Dt Paolo,
236 N.Y. 132, 140 N.E. 220 (1923); Reno v. Bull, 226 N.Y. 546, 124 N.E. 144 (1919);
but cf. Hotaling v. Leach & Co., 247 N.Y. 84, 159 N.E. 870 (1928).

